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2Adrian W. Throop*
Thrift institutions supplying nearly halfof the total credit needs of
housing have experienced recurrent bouts of deposit outflows during
periodsofhigh interest rates. Such outflows wouldhave hada significant
impact on the pace ofresidential investment to the extent that the market
for mortgage credit was not fully integrated with money and capital
markets. In recent years, financial deregulation has tended increasingly
to integrate the mortgage market with other financial markets. This
article estimates the magnitudeofcreditavailability effects on residential
investmentfrom disintermediation at thrifts both before and afterfinan-
cial deregulation, as well as the effect that this deregulation has had on
the cyclical volatility ofinterest rates.
In recent years, financial deregulation has tended
to integrate the market for mortgage credit with
the money and capital markets. This article exam-
ines how the extent of integration has changed the
cyclical behavior of interest rates and residential
investment.
Three major factors insulated the mortgage mar-
ket from other financial markets in the past: 1)
Regulation Qceilings on the interest rates paid on
deposits at thrift institutions that specialize in hous-
ing finance, 2) usury ceilings on mortgage loans,
and 3) a limited secondary market for mortgage
loans. The disintermediation created by ceilings on
deposit rates tended to restrict deposit flows into
thrift institutions in periodsoftightcredit. The thrift
institutions had difficulty offsetting the lack of
deposit inflows by selling off mortgage loans from
their portfolio because of a limited secondary mar-
ket as well as an unwillingness to show capital
losses. Also, usury ceilings reinforced the short-run
tendency of mortgage lenders to ration credit by
means other than interest rates. To the extent that
restrictions on the availability ofmortgage credit at
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thrift institutions could not be offset by other
lenders, the result was more severe fluctuations in
residential investment.
Since most ceilings on deposit rates and usury
ceilings on mortgage rates were removed in the late
1970s and early 1980s, housing should now be able
to compete on .a more nearly equal basis for funds;
and swings in housing construction should be
dampened. Nevertheless, housingstill is likelyto be
affected by tight credit conditions more than other
sectors of the economy because housing demand
has a relatively high sensitivity to interest rates. An
additional consequence of financial deregulation
should be a greater volatility in the general level of
interest rates. This follows because the overall sup-
ply of credit is now being rationed to a greater
degree by price, and also because tight creditcondi-
tions now strike less specifically on housing.!
This article estimates the degree to which finan-
cial deregulation has both moderated the cycle in
residential investment and contributed to greater
volatility in market interest rates. Section Iprovides
a simplified theoretical framework for analyzing the
effects of tight credit conditions on the cyclical
behaviorofresidential investment and interest rates
in regulated versus unregulated financial environ-
ments, and discusses its applicability to recent
housing cycles. Sections II and HI identify pastperiods when regulatory constraints were at least
partly binding and disintermediation at thrifts
resulted in less residential investment than would
have occurred in a deregulated financial environ-
ment. To make the identification, a model of the
housing marketbased purely ondemand factors was
constructed, and then was tested for the additional
influence of deposit inflows at thrift institutions
during periods ofdisintermediation.
Next, Section IV compares the cyclical behavior
of market interest rates and housing activity in
j')¢riodsofbinding regulatory constraints with what
they Would have been in a deregulated financial
enVironment. For this purpose, the model of resi-
pential investment was embedded in a small-scale
structural macroeconomic model. The degree to
whichfinancial deregulation has made interest rates
more volatile and swings in the housing cycle less
severe was then simulated by removing the esti-
mat~d effect of deposit flows on housing activity.
~inal1y, Section V provides a summary ofthe main
findings.
I. The Availability of Credit to Housing
Theoretical Framework
We begin with asimplified theoretical framework
foranlllyzing the effect ofregulatory constraints on
residential investment. For this purpose, consider a
rudimentary financial system in which a regulated
set of financial intermediaries provides housing
finance, whereas borrowers in other sectors of the
economy o~taillcredit in the open market without
the use ofintermediaries. The demand for credit in
each ofthese §~ctors is assumed to be independent
ofthedemlj.ndfOrcreditin the other, but suppliers of
credit shiftJr:e~lY between the two markets in
response to relative interest rates. Without loss of
generality, the cost ofintermediation is assumed to
be ~ero, sqthatthe. supply ofdeposits to the finan-
cial intefP.1e~i~es is identical with the supply of
mortgage <:;redit.lo ultimate borrowers. We also, at
least initially, abstract from problems related to the
maturity structure ofinterest rates.
This model contains two demand functions and
~~g.supply functions. The demand for mortgage
loans, Dm , depends upon the mortgage rate, im ,
Which, in the unregulated financial environment, is
e9u~1 to the deposit rate, id; and the demand for
othertypes ofcredit, Do, is afunction ofthe interest
rate in the open market, io. The supply ofcredit to
financial intermediaries, Sm' and thus ultimate
mortgage borrowers, depends upon boththe deposit
rate, id, and the open market rate, io. The supply of
credit to the open market, So, is a function ofthese
two rates as well.
An initial full equilibrium in the two markets is
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depicted in Panel A of Figure I, where, for sim-
plicity, we assume that at the outset the deposit rate
(andmortgage rate) is thesame as the interestrate in
theopenmarket. Eachofthe initial supply functions
is drawn on the assumption ofan equilibrium value
ofthe interest rate in the other market.
Considernow an increasein thedemandfor credit
in the open market, which has the effect ofshifting
the demand schedule from Do to D'o' In an unregu-
lated financial environment, the resulting higher
interest rate in the open market would shift the
supply offunds in the intermediated market, Sm' to
the left, raising the mortgage rate and depositrate as
well. These higher rates would, in tum, shift the
supply of funds in the open mark:et'i,S", to the left
and raise the interest rate in the op~n.market still
further, and so forth.
The ultimate configuration of interest rates
between the two markets depends upon the sub-
stitutability in supply between the two markets and
the relative elasticities of demand. As long as
lenders do not regard market instruments and thrift
deposits as perfect substitutes, open market rates
would rise by somewhat more than deposit and
mortgage rates. Even in the unregulated environ-
ment, residential investment would fall as more
funds flow toward open market.
The outcome in this unregulated financial
environment contrasts with that when a ceiling is
imposed on the deposit rate at financial intermedi-
aries at the initial level of interest rates, shown in
Panel B. Since the deposit rate cannot change, thesupply schedule for credit to the open market now
remains fixed when the demand for credit rises in
that market. The resulting increase in the interest
rate in the open market then causes a shift offunds
away from deposits at intermediaries, and reduces
the supply ofdeposits from Sm to S'm.
The resulting decline in mortgage credit and
housing activity atthe controlledlevel ofthe deposit
rate will be greater than in the case ofuncontrolled
intermediaries (Qm - Q'mis greaterinPanel B than
in A). Also, the difference in the impact onhousing
between the regulated and unregulated financial
environments will be greater the larger is the sub-
stitutability in supply between the two markets.2
The deposit rate ceiling reduces residential
investment by more than would otherwise occur
becauseofthe temporary marketdisequilibriumand
resulting restriction in the availability of credit.
Compared to the unregulated environment, interest
rates in the open market rise by less. As a result,
nonhousing activity rises more, and residential
investment therefore falls by more than in an unre-
gulated situation. Note also that, although in this
example intere¥rates rise becauseofan increase in
the demand for credit, a similardifference between
controlled and uncontrolled environments exists if
interest rates were to rise because ofa restriction in
the supplyofcredit (as, for example, due to mone-
tary policy).
The excess of mortgage credit demanded over
that supplied, which results from thedisequilibrium
created by the deposit rate ceiling, must somehow
be rationed.3 If usury ceilings on mortgage loans
were binding, mortgagecreditwould berationed by
means other than the mortgage rate, such as by
increasing down payments orsimply by refusing to
lend. Alternatively, if usury ceilings on mortgage
loans were notbinding, the mortgagerate couldrise
Figure 1
Interest Rate Ceilings and the Availability
of Credit to Housing
A. No Interest Rate Ceiling on Deposits
Q' o
B. With Interest Rate Ceiling on Deposits
65relative to the deposit rate to ration the available
supply of funds. In the short-run, however, mort-
gage rates are slow to adjust to market forces while
other dimensions of price tend to be altered first.
Still, the argument about the effect of disinter-
mediation on the availability of credit to housing
does not depend on the exact means used to ration
the restricted supply ofmortgage credit.
This simple model captures the essence of the
credit availability effects generated by deposit rate
ceilings at thrift institutions. However, because
thrift institutionsgenerally supply no more thanhalf
of total residential home mortgage credit, these
availability effects could be offset by other lenders
less subject to deposit rate regulation than thrifts.
The extent ofoffset depends on the substitutability
of other investments for mortgage loans. Unless
mortgage loans and investments in the portfolios of
these otherlenders were perfect substitutes, restrict-
ing credit availability at thrifts could still have some
impact on the total supply of mortgage credit and
residential construction.
In addition, thrift institutions themselves may be
able to reduce the effects ofdeposit rate ceilings by
tapping alternative sources of funds. Ifthese alter-
native sources were not perfectly substitutable for
regulated deposits, however, some credit avail-
ability effects due to disintermediation may remain.
Regulation Q and Government Support of
the MortgageMarket
We now tum to a discussion of the degree to
which Regulation Qhas affected different types of
mortgage lenders, as well as the major alternative
sources of funds available to thrifts. Regulation Q
ceilings were imposed on deposit rates at commer-
cial banks in the 1930s. Their purpose was to
prevent excessive competition for funds, which was
thoughtto have beenoneofthe majorcauses ofbank
failures. Because market rates of interest typically
were below the ceilings, these ceilings had little
effect on the financial system until the mid-1960s.
As the ceilings became binding, however, they were
extended to savings and loan associations and
mutual savings banks, although these institutions
were given a favorable rate differential over com-
mercial banks in an attempt to protect the flow of
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housing credit through them. The differential ceil-
ings prevented an outflow of funds from thrifts to
banks but did little to prevent outflows into unregu-
lated intermediaries and to the open market during
periods ofdisintermediation in 1966-67, 1967-70,
and 1973-74 brought on by rising interest rates.
Commercial banks were generally able to adjust
to periods ofdisintermediation betterthan thrifts for
several reasons. First, in the earlier years, commer-
cial banks had relatively large holdings of govern-
ment securities that could be sold off to offset the
effectsofdepositoutflows. Second, banks soughtto
overcome the effects of disintermediation by
developing new sources offunds - the most impor-
tant of which were Eurodollar borrowings and
issues of bank-related commercial paper. Third,
Regulation Q ceilings were ,lifted on large negoti-
able CDs maturing in 30 to 89 days in 1970, and on
all such CDs in 1973.
In contrast, thrifts did not have large holdings of
secondary reserves. They were slow to develop new
sources offunds beyond Federal Home Loan Bank
advances, and they did notbegin to issue significant
amounts of large CDs until the late 1970s. Since
thrift institutions are the main suppliers ofmortgage
credit, there was a potential for significant credit
availability effects on residential investment during
the periods ofdisintermediation.
Government-sponsored agencies have pursued
activities to offset some of the effects of disinter-
mediation4. The most importantoffsetfor thrifts has
consisted of advances from Federal Home Loan
Banks, which tend to rise in periods of disinter-
mediation and weak housing activity, and to fall in
other periods. Since Federal Home Loan Banks
obtain the funds for these advances by borrowing in
the open market - a practice that puts further
pressure on market interest rates, their activities
have tended to generate further disintermediation at
thrifts. Nevertheless, the net effectofFederal Home
Loan Bank advances has probably been to reduce
credit availability effects on residential investment,
at least in the short-run.
The Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or "Fannie Mae") and, to a lesser extent,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC or "Freddie Mac") have also tended tooffsetsomeoftheeffectsofdisintermediation. They
have done so byissuing debt and using the proceeds
to buy mortgage loans from thrifts. Constituting
another source of support have been sales of
federally guaranteed participations in mortgage
pools by the Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (GNMA or"Ginnie Mae) and Freddie Mac.
Thesepools, which tap broadersourcesofmortgage
finance than just deposits at thrifts, became impor-
tant after 1970. However, the activities of FNMA
and the other agencies have been less countercycli-
cal than those ofthe Federal Home Loan Banks.
Recent Financial Deregulation
Although the extentofcountercyclical support to
mortgage finance by government agencies has not
changed much in recent years, financial deregula-
tion has integrated the mortgage market more com-
pletely with money and capital markets. The first
major element of deregulation affecting housing
was a relaxation of Regulation Q ceilings in June
1978. This relaxation allowed both thrifts and com-
mercial banks to issue Money Market Certificates
with an interest rate tied to the rate on six-month
Treasury Bills.5 Subsequently, the Deregulationand
MonetaryControlActof1980authorized the phase-
out and ultimate elimination of all limitations on
interestanddividendspaidondeposits andaccounts
at depository institutions. The phase-out period
lasted until April 1986, butsubstantial deregulation
took place almost immediately.6 In addition, the
Deregulation and Monetary Control Acteliminated
state usury ceilings for residential mortgage loans
andbroadenedthe assetpowers ofthrift institutions.
These. changes have enhanced the ability ofthrift
institutions to attract funds inperiods oftight credit
and given them more flexibility in managing their
assets. As shown in Chart I, however, sharp cycles
in the flow ofreal, orinflation-adjusted, deposits to
thrifts were not eliminated. Even after the introduc-
tion ofMoney MarketCertificates in June 1978, the
total flow ofreal deposits into thrifts varied sharply
and inversely with the overall level ofinterest rates.
Nevertheless, the fact that movements in deposit
inflows continued to be associated with changes in
interest rates does not necessarily indicate that reg-
ulation effectively continues to constrain housing
finance. Nor are earlier cycles in deposit flows
necessarily evidence ofeffectively binding regula-
tory constraints in those periods.
Deposit inflows to thrifts would tend to follow a
cyclical pattern in response to variations in interest
rates even in a completely unregulated financial
environment. Outflows ofdeposits could still occur
Percent
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1976 1980 1984in such anenvironmentwhen the demandfor mort-
gagefinance is curtailedbyhigh levels ofmortgage
rates, thus reducing the amount of deposits that
thrift institutions are willing to supply.
In Section III, we will estimate the impact that
regulatory constraints have had on residential
investment through restricting the supply of mort-
gage creditfrom thrifts. As partofthis analysis, we
examine whethercredit availability effects at thrifts
continued to play a role after 1978 or whether the
fluctuation in deposit flows at thrifts in the
post-1978 years was purely demand-induced.
II. An Empirical Model of Residential Investment
or
In K* In bo + I - bl In N + bl In YDP
- b2 1n DC - b2 In(Pph)
(3a)
Thus, the nominal user cost, Pu' equals some
fraction of the asset price of housing, Ph' deter-
minedby the marketrate ofinterest, i, the expected
rateofinflation,p, andtherateofphysicaldeprecia-
tion, d. Therateofinterest, i, is equalto thenominal
costofcapital so thati- Pis the correspondingreal
long-termrate ofinterest.9 The ratio ofthe nominal
user cost to the asset price of housing (equal to
i- P+d) is referred to as the real user cost, DC.
The real usercosts for owner-occupiedandrental
units differ because ofthe effects oftaxation. 10 We
employ a weighted average of these costs - with
weights of three-fourths and one-fourth, respec-
tively - to obtain the aggregate real usercost, DC.
Pu from equation 2 can then be substituted into
equation I to obtain:
(3)
Pu = nominal user cost ofcapital
Ph = asset price ofhousing
= market rate ofinterest
p = expected rate ofinflation
d = rate of physical depreciation of
housing assets.
where:





where K* = quantityofhousingdemandedin
1972 dollars
N = population
YDP = permanent disposable income in
1972 dollars8
Pu = nominal user cost of housing
capital
P = general price level.
The nominal user cost ofhousing capital, Pu' is
the per period payment for capital and is analogous
to a wage rate for labor. In the absence oftaxes, the
nominalusercostinthecurrentperiodcanbe shown
to be proportionate to the asset price of housing
according to the formula:
Inthis section, we develop aneconometricmodel
of residential investment in which the demand of
housing in combination with the current stock of
housing determines the current relative price of
housing. The amountofresidential investmentthen
responds totheprofitabilityofconstructionas deter-
mined by the relative price ofhousing7•
We begin with an analysis ofthe determinants of
the demand for the stock ofhousing. The percapita
real demand for the stock ofhousing is assumed to
depend upon per capita permanent real disposable
income and the nominal user cost of capital in
housing relative to the general price level. Thus,
(2)
68Thus, the stock of housing demanded is a func-
tion of population, pennanent disposable income,
and the real asset price of housing, as well as tax
factors, the depreciation rate, and the real interest
rate contained inthe real tiser cost ratio, Uc.
In the short~run, the current stock ofhousing, K,
is fixed, and the real asset price of housing, Ph/P,
adjusts to clear the market for housing, as shown in
Panel A of Figure 2. SettingK equal to K* and
rearranging terms, this equilibrium condition
implies:
The supplyofresidential investmentin the model
is characterized by a conventional supply function.
Because of capacity constraints, marginal costs
increase with the rate ofconstruction. The amount
ofbuilding is therefore an increasing functionofthe
real asset price ofhousing, scaled by the size ofthe
existing capital stock:
(5)
This supply function for residential investment is
shown in Panel B ofFigure 2. Gross real residential
investmentcantherefore beobtainedbysubstituting
the detenninantsofthe real assetprice ofhousing in
equation 4 into equation 5a, giving.
lnfph\=_l_lnbo + I-blInN (4)
\PI b2 b2
+ ~ In YDP - In UC - ~ In K
b2 b2
With a given stock of housing, an increase in
population or pennanent income drives up the real
asset price ofhousing until the higher relative user
cost equates the quantity demanded with the avail-
able stock. Conversely, an increase in the current
housingstockreduces the real asset price, andhence
the relative user cost, until the increase in the
quantity demanded equals the increase in the stock
available. Finally, a change in the real interest rate,
the effective tax on the cost of capital, or the
depreciation rate would produce offsetting changes
in the real asset price of housing until the relative
user cost is the same as before.
or













Residential InvestmentSeveral modifications were made to this basic
equation to reflectinstitutional realities in the hous-
ingmarket. First, a dummy variable, CC, having a
value of 1for the second and third quarters of 1980
and zero otherwise, was added to capture the effect
of President Carter's credit control program that
caused a temporary decline in the availability of
credit. Second, all the explanatory variables were
lagged three quarters to allow for an interval
between achange in underlying supply and demand
conditions and the response ofhousing asset prices
and building activity.
A third modification was a change in the mea-
surement of the real user cost. In principle, this
measurement should contain the real after-tax mort-
gage rate and non-price terms of mortgage credit.
However, mortgage rates tend to move sluggishly,
with most adjustmentin the short-run taking place
intl1ehll1'd-to-measure nonprice terms of credit.
Therefore, a distributed lag on the real after-tax 6-
month commercial paper rate was used instead.II
The realafter-tax commercial paper rate was first
usedtodefine the user cost for owner-occupied and
rental housing. Then the resulting real aggregate
user cost, DC, was entered into the investment
equa.tion in distributed lag form. The best fitting
distributedlag was three quarters inlength. This lag
covers the interval between changes in short-term
interest rates and the response in the cost of mort-
ga.ge credit as well as the time it takes for builders to
respond to the resulting change in housing prices.
Also, short-terminterestrates enterdirectly into the
construction costs ofbuilders.
m. Testing for Credit Availability Effects
The model of residential investment in the pre- tialinvestment than could be captured by the model
ceding section assumes that housing construction is would result; and the model's prediction error in
driven by the demand factors determining housing these periods would tend to be associated with the
prices and the response of builders to the prof- extent ofdeposit outflows.
itability of new construction. The availability of Even after the major relaxation of Regulation Q
credit to housing was not viewed as an additional ceilings in June 1978 that allowed the introduction
constraint on residential investment. More specifi- of Money Market Certificates, thrift institutions
cally, the real after-tax interest rate in the real user suffered another major slowing in deposit flows
cost ofhousing capital was assumed to depend only between 1979.Q3 and 1982.Q1. For this most
upon open market interest rates (as represented by recent period, aquestion ofparticular importance is
the 6-month commercial paper rate) and not on whether the remaining regulatory constraints con-
variables specific to housing. tributed significantly to the slowdown in deposit
Previous researchers, in contrast, have found flows or whether the slowdown reflected only the
evidence of significant credit availability effects on response of housing demand to variations in the
residential investment in three periods: 1966.Q3- generallevel ofrealinterestrates. As shown earlier,
1967.Ql, 1969.Q3-1970.Q3, and 1973.Q4- even in an unregulated market, thrift institutions
1975.Q2. 12 As shown in Chart 1, these periods would be expected to raise their deposit rates less
correspond to times of severe disintermediation at than other market rates when higher real interest
thrift institutions, when Regulation Q ceilings were rates produce a contraction in residential invest-
binding and growth in real deposits fell to less than a ment. Deposit flows would slow as a result, even in
I-percent annual rate. Ifrestrictions on credit avail- the absence of significant credit availability effects
ability resulting from deposit outflows were not on housing.
fully offset by adjustments of thrift institutions We tested for the presence of credit availability
themselves orby increased quantities ofcredit from effects on residential investment by adding vari-
other lenders in the mortgage market, the user cost abIes to the basic model that have values equal to the
ofhousing capital would rise by significantly more percentage change in real deposits at thrift institu-
than open market interest rates in these periods. A tions, lagged either 1or2 quarters (DFI and DF2),
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value of zero otherwise. 13 The same deposit flow
variables for aU the other remaining quarters
(DFl:OTHER and DF2:0THER) were also
included as controls to make sure that lagged
were not picking up normal variations
in residential investment not adequatelycapturedby
the basic modeL Finally, since the relationship
between credit availability effects and deposit flows
I1Yljothes:ize:d to be a marginal one occurring only
inperiods ofsevere disintermediation, dummy vari-
ables (DUM) aU()wing for .shifts inthe intercept
term were also entered for each period of severe
disintermediation. The resulting estimate of the
complete model (with t statistics given in paren-
theses) is shown as equation 1 in the table.
The explanatory variables in the basic model all
have theoretically plausible signs and are statis-
tically significant at greater than the 1percent leveL
In addition, the Cartercredit controls have a signifi-
cant impact, even if only for a brief period. Most
importantly, the deposit flow variables measuring
potential credit availability effects on residential
investment are statistically significant at either 1or
2 lags in each of the first three periods of severe
disintermediation, but not in the fourth period that
occurred after the introduction of Money Market
Certificates in 1978.
Although the depositflow variable at 2 lags in the
first period of disintermediation (DF2: 66-67) is
significant at only the 15 percent level in equation 1
ofthe table, it becomes significant at betterthan a 1
percent level when other insignificant variables are
dropped, as shown in equation 2 of the same table.
The deposit flow variable at 2 lags for the third
period ofdisintermediation (DF2: 73-75) is signifi-
cant at only the 10 percent level in both equations 1
and 2. To simulate the effect offinancial deregula-
tion, we accept the hypothesis ofcredit availability
effects inthatperiodeven thoughthestatisticalbasis
for doing so is somewhat weak. This assumption
tends to maximize the potential effect that financial
deregulation can have on the simulated behavior of
the economy.
Finally, neither of the deposit flow variables for
the remaining quarters (DFI:OTHER .and
DF2:0THER)is statistically significant. Thelackof
statistical significance for these control variables
indicatesthatthe depositflow variables in periods of
71seve~ disilltermedia.tiQnare not simply picking up




periods ofsevere disintermediationatthrifts priorto
1978 but not afterwards, and that the extentofthese
credit availability effects was closely related to
marginal variations in deposit inflows. 14
IV. Simulated Effects of F.inancial Deregulation
Although credit availability effects on housing
appear to have been present in periods ofdisinter-
mediation priorto 1978, the quantitative magnitude
of theseeffeGts and their impact on the cyclical
behaviorofhoth residential investment and interest
rates remains to be examined. For this purpose the
model ofresidential investment estimated in equa-
tion 2ofthe table, including significantdeposit flow
effects, was embedded in a small-scale structural
model of the economy. IS Historical errors in each
equation of the model were added back so that a
dynamic simulation could replicate history exactly.
Then, the degree to which financial deregulation
would have made interest rates more volatile and
lessened the severity of the housing cycle was
determined by setting the coefficients ofthedeposit
flow variables (including intercept dummies) in
equation 2 equal to zero and re-simulating the
model. The paths ofmonetary growth, as measured
by Ml, and all otherexogenous variables were kept
unchanged in the simulation, giving interest'rates
full scope to adjust. 16
The key short-term interest rate in the model that
drives the general level of interest rates is the 6-
month commercial paper rate. Charts 2 and 3 show
the difference between the historical paths of real
Chart 2
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Shaded areas represent periods of estimated
credit availability effects.
72residential investment and the real 6-month com-
mercial paper rate over the 1962 to 1984 period
compared to those resulting from the simulation
where no credit availability effects are allowed to
operate through deposit flows. In that simulation,
the lack of any credit availability effects directed
specifically at housing in periods of tight credit
reduces the cyclical variability ofresidential invest-
ment. While the absence ofsuch credit availability
effects put greater pressure on the general level of
interest rates in those periods, it also tends to
dampen interest-sensitiveexpenditures in allsectors
ofthe economy and not in housing alone. The result
isa net benefit for housing as the impact oftighter
credit conditions is more evenly distributed.
An absence ofcredit availability effects was sim-
ulated to increase residential investment by up to 12
percent in some quarters during the periods of
severe disintermediation in 1966.Q3-1967.QI,
1969.Q3-1970.Q3 and 1973.Q4-1975.Q2. How-
ever, because of the overall sensitivity of the
demand for housing to interestrates and the fact that
RegulationQ ceilings were bindingduringonlypart
ofthe historical period, the reduction in the overall
cyclical variability ofresidential investment result-
ing from theeliminationofcreditavailability effects
is estimated to be relatively small.
A quantitative measure of cyclical variability is
the .standard deviation in percentage terms.of.a
variable from its trend. The lower this standard
deviation, •the less the variability. For the period
1966 to 1975, the standard deviation ofresidential
investment from its trend fell from 18.9 percent to
18.3 percent in the simulated absence of credit
availability effects, reducing overall variability by
only 3.2 percent.
Both this statistic and a visual examination of
Chart 2 confirm that the major reason for cycles in
residential investment in the past has been the
relatively high sensitivity of housing demand to
interest rates rather than the credit availability
effects caused by interest rate ceilings and other
financial regulations.
Chart 3
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73Atthesametimethatithas reducedthevariability
ofresidentialinvestment, financial deregulation has
increasedthe. volatilityofinterestrates..Thesimula-
tion shows that, in the absence of the credit avail-
abilityeffectsij$sqciatecLwith interestr~teceHings
andotherJinancial regulations, real interest rates
would.have risen by somewhat larger. amountsin
periods of tight credit. However, because credit
avaHability\effectsareestimategto be quite small,
tlleoveraUincrease in the v;rriability ofreal interest
ratesis alW relatively small. Thus, in the 1966 to
1975. period,. the standard deviation of the real
commercial paperrate from its mean rose.from 131
basispointsinthe historicalobservationto 141 basis
pointsin the simulation, giving only a 7.6 percent
increase in the variability ofreal short-term interest
rates.
The removal of credit availability effects in past
periods of tight credit would have raised real GNP
somewhat in those periods. This is because the
74
boost to interest rates from eliminating credit avail-
abilityeffectswouldhaveraisedtheincomevelocity
ofMI. With an unchanged path ofgrowth forM1,
the rise inits incomevelocity would have raised the
level ofGNP. Thus,.the.higherlevelofresidential
investment would not have been fully offset by
reductions in othertypesofinterest-sensitiveexpen-
ditures. Since periods of significantcredit avail-
ability effectstendedtocoincide witheithergrowth
recessions or actual recessions,financial deregula-
tion would have had an overan stabilizing effect on
the economy. The overall degree .ofcyclicalvari-
ability as measured by the standarddeviation ofreal
GNP from trend in percentage terms would have
been reduced only slightly, however -from 3.0
percent to 2.97 percent in the simulation. Thus, we
estimate that eliminating credit availability effects
would have stabilizedtheeconomy as a whole to an
even smaner degree than it would have moderated
cycles in residential investment.V. Conclusions




thrifts appear to have been related mainly to the
effects of Regulation Q ceilings. However, even
after the substantial relax.ation of Regulation Q
ceilings in 1978 allowingthe introductionofMoney
MarketCertificates, thrifts experienceddepositout-
flows in the next period of high interest rates.
Manifestly, disintermediation at thrifts can occur
with or without pervasive Regulation Q ceilings.
Indeed, since residential investment is highly inter-
est-sensitive, strong cycles in deposit flows at thrifts
would be expected to occur even in completely
unregulated markets since the thrifts' needs for
deposits vary with the amount of mortgage loans
demanded.
In general, analysts have linked significant credit
availability effects on residential investment with
earlier periods ofdisintermediation. However, even
in those periods of disintermediation, the flow of
credit to housing need not have been reduced if
thrifts could have sold offassets in secondary mar-
kets or borrowed from govemment agencies while
other lenders provided alternative sources ofhous-
ing finance. Similarly, the disintermediation occur-
ring at thrifts after 1978 does not necessarily indi-
catesignificantcreditavailability effects. The extent
of credit availability effects in both the earlier and
more recent periods is an empirical issue.
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We have tested for the influenceofdisintermedia-
tionat thriftsonresidentialinvestmentinthecontext
of an econometric model of the housing market.
Statistically significantcredit availability effectson
residential investment were found for the periods of
1966.Q3-1967.Q1, 1969.Q3-1970.Q3, and
1973.Q4-1975.Q2,.but not for the most recent
period of disintermediation, 1979.Q3-1982.Q1,
which followed a substantial relaxation of Regula-
tionQ.
Regulatory restrictions are estimated to have
reduced residential investment by up to 12 percent
in some quarters during the three earlier periods.
However, those periods were relatively short, and
residential investment is highly cyclical even in the
absence ofcreditavailability effects. As aresult, we
estimate regulatory restrictions to have accounted
for only about 3 percent of the total variability of
residential investment in the 1965 to 1975 period.
Credit availability effects on housing, when they
were found, were estimated to have reduced the
overall variability ofreal short-term interestrates by
only 7to 8percent. This reduction in the volatilityof
interestrates resulted from financial regulations that
tended to concentrate the effects of tight credit on
residential investment. Conversely, financial
deregulation since the mid-1970s has increased the
volatility of interest rates, but only to the same
modest degree of7 to 8 percent. The much higher
variability inreal interestrates experiencedsincethe
late 1970s cannot be explained by the estimated
effects offinancial deregulation.(4.24) (3.11)
p + d + tp(1-c)] = Ph· UCR
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The appropriate tax rate, t, for owner-occupied housing
is the average marginal tax rate for households, while the
highervalued corporate tax rate is used for rental housing.
For derivations of these formulas, see Ott, Ott, and Yoo
(1975) or Throop (1984).
Data on the stock of housing, the corporate tax rate, the
property tax rate, and the present value of depreciation
come from the Board of Governors. The data series for the
average marginal tax rate on household income is from
Barro and Shahasakul (1983). The latter series has been
updated by the Economics Research Group of Goldman
Sachs and the author.
11. The estimated equation for forecasting U.S. inflation
over the maturity of the 6-month commercial paper rate is:
where tp is the property tax rate. . ..
The return on owner-occupied capital takes the ImpliCit
form of the services provided, and therefore is not taxed.
Consequently, the nominal user cost of owner-occupied
housing capital is:
Equations based on monetary growth overpredict inflation
in 1982 and 1983 by a substantial margin because of an
unusual decline in M1 velocity. However, because the
demand for M1 was stable, the decline in M1 velocity can
be explained statistically by the decline in inflation and
nominal interest rates that occurred in the period. When
M1-growth is adjusted for this effect, it continues to predict
the growth ofnominal incomeand inflation reasonablywell.
Consequently, for this period, an adjusted M1-growth was
used in the inflation forecasting equation instead of actual
15
YDP = ~ (1-ex)exi (1+T)iYD_i
1=0
FOOTNOTES
1. More than a decade ago, Duesenberry (1969) antici- The parameter ex, chosen to minimize the error in the
pated that financial deregulation would result in more equation, is equal to 0.5.
variation in interest rates over the business cycle. More 9. Hall (1977) and Jorgensen (1963) offer a different inter-
recent discussions of this point are Lombra (1984) and pretation of this formula in which the appropriate interest
Keaton (1986). The quantitative importance of thiS effect rate isthereal short-term rateeventhough the capital good
has been a matter of considerable dispute, however. Two is along-lived asset. For criticisms of their approach and
extreme views are Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) and support for the more traditional one, see comments and
Wojilower(1980). discussion in Hall (1977) and Throop (1984).
2. These two points are most easily demonstrated in the 10. Income from rental housing is taxed at the rate, c,
simplest case where the total supply of credit to the two applicable to either corporate or individual income after
markets is fixed. Since there is a smaller Increase In open deductions are madefor depreciation. If the present value
market .interest rates, and hence movement along the of depreciation allowances per dollar of investment is
demand curve, 0'0' when the deposit rate IS controlled, denoted by z, the nominal user cost of capital invested in
there IS a larger Increase In credit supplied to the open rental housing can be shown to be:
market. Given that the aggregate supply of credit IS fixed,
the quantityofcreditsupplied to the mortgagemarketmust
then fall to a larger extent when deposit rates are
regulated.
Introducing some positive responseof the total supplyof
creditwith respectto interest rates increasesthe size ofthe
impactof depositrate ceilingson the availabilityofcreditto
housing. In this situation, the amount of credit available to
the mortgage market declines by more when deposit rates
are regulated not only because the rise in the interest rate
paid bythe competing open-market sector is less, but also
becausethetotal amount ofcreditavailableto both sectors
is reduced by the relatively lower interest rate.
3. The important distinction between this type of dis-
equilibrium credit rationing and that which can occureven
in market equilibrium is discussed in Baltensperger
(1978).
4. Useful surveys of the impact of government-sponsored
agencies on the mortgage market include Grebler (1977),
Hicks (1978), and Hendershott and Villani (1977, Ch. 3).
5. The effect of the introduction of Money Market Certifi-
cates on housing starts in the 1978-79expansion has been
explored in Jaffee and Rosen (1979). A limitation of this
study is that the introduction of Money Market Certificates
is assumed to have no effect on the general level of interest
rates. More specifically, in their simulation, the Federal
Reserve is assumed to follow an interest rate target.
However, when the Federal Reserve targets the stock of
money, rather than interest rates, the stimulus to housing
from the introduction of Money Market Certificates (orother
relaxations of restrictive regulations) would be blunted by
upward pressure on market interest rates. The present
study allows for such interest rate effects by incorporating
a model of residential investment into a complete mac-
roeconomic model.
6. The details and economic implicationsof the Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980 are analyzed in
Cargill and Garcia (1982).
7. For further elaboration of this approach, see De Leeuw
and Gramlich (1969) and Kearl (1979).
8. Permanent disposable income is calculated as a 15-
quarter distributed lag on disposable income with geo-
metrically declining weights adjusted for the trend in
income:
76M1-growth. The adjustment factors that were used are
described in Judd and McElhattan (1983). For an analysis
of the effect ofthe decline in velocityon inflation and why it
occurred, see Throop (1984a,b).
The expected inflation term in the real interest rate was
given a weight of only one-half, which effectively weights
the real interest rate by one-half and the nominal interest
rate by one-half. This weight was determined by fitting the
model with weightson expectedinflation ranging from zero
to one. The significance of the nominal interest rate is due
to the factthat a higher ratio of nominal mortgage pay-
ments to current income makes borrowers less able to
borrow and lenders less willing to lend.
12. See, for example, the housing sector in the MPS
econometric model of the U.S. economy, as described in
Brayton and Mauskopf (1985).
13. The exact periods of severe disintermediation are
defined as intervals of less than 1-percent growth in real
deposits with a 1-quarterlag to allowforthe time between a
change in deposit flows and significant effects on
expenditures.
14. These results do not appear to be particularly sensi-
tive to the precise methodology used. For example, ordi-
nary dummy variables take on significantly negative signs
during the first three periods of severe disintermediation,
but are not generally significant in either the fourth period
of severe disintermediation or in the control period. More-
over, the size of the estimated quantitative effects on
residential investment in the first three periods obtained by
using dummy variables is roughly the same as that esti-
mated with deposit flow variables.
The finding of an absence of credit availability effects
after 1978 is consistent with the work of Jaffee and Rosen
(1979) and Furlong (1985). Jaffee and Rosen found that
the growth rate of small-denomination deposits at savings
institutions had a significant impact on mortgage rates
prior to 1979, but Furlong shows that this relationship
ceased to hold in subsequent years.
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15. The theory underlying the model follows the mainline
neo-Keynesian view embodied in most large-scale struc-
tural econometric models. In the short-run, the slow speed
of adjustment of wages and prices allows monetary policy
and other factors to influence real interest rates, which, in
turn,drive real aggregatedemand and output. However, in
the long-run, real interest rates are determined by the
balance between saving and investment atfullemploy-
ment. Particular attention is paid in the model to the way
that real interest rates enter into the cost of capital for
specific types of investment.
An earlierversion of this structural model oftheeconomy
is described in summary form in Throop (1985) and in
greater detail in Throop (1984c). Both publications are
available upon request. Additional equations for the
demand for M1, the unemployment rate, the share of
personal disposable income in GNP, and the inflation rate
have been included in the current version of the model. A
complete description of the current version and simula-
tions of its dynamic properties will be pUblished in a
forthcoming issue of the Economic Review.
16. Actual values of M1 could not be reproduced exactly
in this simulation of the effects of deregulation because of
the dynamic properties of the model. Interest rates affect
both the demand for M1, given the level ofincome, and the
level of income itself, with distributed lags. Thus, only a
fraction of the total direct and indirect effects on M1 from a
change in interest rates occurs within the current period.
If interest rates were changed enough to hit an M1 path
exactly in the current period, then the lagged effects of the
change in interest rates would have to be offset in future
periods, resulting in future interest rate movements in the
opposite direction. To reproduce the M1 path exactly in
each period may require ever larger changes in interest
rates overtime. This is an exampleofinstrument instability.
See, for exampl~, Holbrook (1972). A degree of interest
rate smoothing was therefore required. Still, the average
deviation of simulated M1from historical M1was only halfa
billion dollars.REFERENCES
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